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When people communicate, they create shared representations of realityda common
ground of meaning. This article concerns mapping the dynamic process through which
people create such common ground during an interaction. The Dynamic Negotiation
Network methodology allows us to investigate the structure of shared understanding that
negotiators come to as they reach an agreement through interaction. We also look at how
negotiator characteristics can inﬂuence communication and, in effect, the shared reality
that is generated. Our preliminary qualitative ﬁndings suggest that individuals who have a
high need for cognitive closure, that is, who are eager to maintain their way of viewing the
world, create more complex meaning structures when communicating than do people
whose need for cognitive closure is low, that is, who are more ﬂexible in negotiating the
form a shared reality should take. Complex structures are characterized by more skewed
distributions of connections between elements. The communication contexts we use are
transcriptions of a dyadic negotiation simulation.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
People communicate with each other; this is one of the essential elements of human life. Communication can have a
number of positive consequences that provide an adaptive advantage from an evolutionary perspective, but also serve as a
basis for humanity’s further development, as a mean for the creation and propagation of culture, a sense of community,
establishment of legal systems etc. Communication is thus a process that has been shaped over the course of human history
(Hodges, 2014) and is deeply embedded in biological, social, and historical contexts (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2010). In order to
communicate effectively, common ground must be established (Clark and Brennan, 1991). The process of constructing
common ground (and the ultimate form this common ground takes) may be different depending on the individual pre-
dispositions of the communicators. In this article, we explore these divergences using the example of need for cognitive
closure (NCC). NCC affects how people communicate: how easily they accept new ideas and interpretations, how ﬁrmly they
maintain their a priori positions, etc. In the end, this can affect how satisﬁed they are with both the process and the outcome
of their communications with others. Our analyses were conducted within the framework of the Dynamical Negotiation
Networks (DNN) model (Jochemczyk and Nowak, 2010), which allowed us to formalize the dynamics of the process of
communication and its inﬂuence on the ultimate structure of the common ground that was reached.DNN, Dynamical Negotiation Networks.
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The process of communication requires mutual understanding, not only in the technical sense of “Did I understand the
words that were said?” but also in the sense of “What did my interaction partner have in mind, saying those words?”.
Interaction partners formulate images of what the other side knows about the issues being discussed and about the areas of
knowledge (and ignorance) of the other side (Cooley, 1902). This is how “common ground” (Clark and Brennan, 1991) – a
shared representation of reality (Hardin and Higgins,1996) – is created. Common ground is the shared knowledge, beliefs and
assumptions (Clark and Carlson, 1982; Clark and Marshall, 1981) that constitute the basis for understanding reality as well as
making judgements about the issues represented, and making decisions (Clark and Brennan, 1991).
Creating common ground is a dynamic and complicated process whose timeframe is difﬁcult to determine. The inter-
action, as it proceeds, follows various pathways, engaging new information that enriches and changes the common ground
(Clark and Brennan, 1991). The dynamic of this process depends on the goals of the interaction, on particular acts of
communication, and on the medium that is used to communicate (Clark and Schaefer, 1989, 1987; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs,
1986; Isaacs and Clark, 1987). That is why common ground is continually being negotiated throughout an interaction.
In order to create common ground, each interlocutor must achieve two fundamental goals: to understand the interaction
partner, and to be understood by the interaction partner. How is this done? According to the model proposed by Clark and
Schaefer (1989), communication acts have two phases: ﬁrst one side presents some kind of content (wanting it to be un-
derstood) then the other side responds, either conﬁrming that he or she understood, or denying understanding. Presenting
content is done by uttering it. For example, one person says to the other, “You look nice today.” By uttering this sentence, the
individual has presented her content. Now, she needs the other side to indicate whether the communicationwas understood.
This can be done in a number of ways: assent (“Oh, thank you!”), inquiry (“I look what today?”), going a step further (“You
too!”), referring to the utterance, and so on. The essence of these communications is conﬁrming that the utterance was
understood, or indicating that it was not. As the interaction continues, the utterances and the connections between them
create a network. Thanks to this procedure, a broad space ofmutual understanding is established. This example is very simple,
but the mechanism itself concerns many different and more complicated discussions, in which creating a shared set of
concepts and knowledge does not seem so obvious.
1.2. Negotiation
Negotiations constitute a distinctive form of communication, making them useful for research on communication for
several reasons. First, negotiations might be conducted between people who have differing perspectives and representations
of the negotiated issue. This forces them to work out a shared understanding. Second, the aim of the negotiation is to make a
shared decision on the negotiated issue (Arvanitis, 2015; Arvanitis and Karampatzos, 2013; Jochemczyk and Nowak, 2009,
2010). Third, apart from their overt aims, the negotiators have hidden aims, such as those connected to creating a self-
image (for example, as an expert in the ﬁeld), or establishing a long-term relationship with the other side (for example, as
a business partner). Thus, they might wish to be understood in a way that is not reﬂective of their actual aims. Fourth, the
sides often have interests thatmake it disadvantageous to change their representations of the issue, at the same time as such a
change might be necessary to come to a shared decision. Fifth, the sides want (or at least pretend to want) to come to an
understanding on at least the critical points. That is, they might not agree on all issues, but in order that the negotiations end
successfully, they have to at least come to an agreement on the key issues surrounding the decision being made. Sixth, if the
negotiators want to get a better result, theymust increase the quality of the communication by conducting talks in such away
as to understand the needs of the other side, even if those needs are not explicitly stated. Thus, in order to achieve success in
negotiationsdthat is, an agreementdit is necessary to create common ground, which will then serve as a basis for the
agreement. It is not necessary that this common ground encompass the whole truth as both sides see it, but at least those
elements that must be mutually agreed upon must be similarly deﬁned among the negotiators. Thus, negotiations provide an
excellent example of communication in which common ground is established, where we can observe the process of estab-
lishing it, and where we can analyze how the formal characteristics of creating common ground relate to the quality of the
agreement and satisfaction with the process of the talks.
In negotiations, we can theoretically distinguish the objective result of the process of communication (the outcome) from
the subjective satisfactionwith the outcome and with the process of communication. These distinctions are not always made
in practice, but their unique determinants and consequences have been demonstrated (e.g. Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler,
2008). Moreover, it is possible to attain a win-lose result, in which only one side’s needs are met, a win–win solution
(both side’s needs are met), or a lose–lose result, in which neither side’s needs are met (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Lewicki et al.,
2010; Walton and McKersie, 1965). Based on the outcome, we can identify whether the process of creating common ground
was beneﬁcial for one side or for both or for neither. Additionally, we can separate task-related satisfaction (achieving a
speciﬁc negotiation outcome) from satisfaction related to the interaction with the negotiation partner (procedural satisfac-
tion) (Deutsch, 2006, 2011).
These three end results of negotiations (the outcome, outcome satisfaction, and process satisfaction) are related but
distinct constructs and can bemeasured separately. Therefore, we can determine how speciﬁc characteristics of the process of
communication inﬂuence each of these three results separately and in interaction. This makes negotiations a type of
communication that lends itself particularly well to research.
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The process of negotiation is affected by contextual (situational) factors, such as the topic under discussion, or the medium
through which discussion takes place (Purdy et al., 2000; Shefﬁeld, 1995) as well as by person factors, that is, the charac-
teristics of the negotiators themselves (Elfenbein, 2013; Elfenbein et al., 2008). It is widely accepted that what distinguishes
outstanding negotiators from failed ones are personal characteristics, although research results are not entirely univocal on
this issue. Some studies indicate that the effect of personality traits is negligible next to situational factors (Bazerman et al.,
2000; Greenhalgh et al., 1985; Hosmanek and Mccormick, 2014), while others indicate that better measures of personality
demonstrate greater impacts on negotiation (Barry and Friedman, 1998; Elfenbein et al., 2008; Maw Der Foo et al., 2004).
Many individual differences affect negotiations: personality or temperament variables, differences in levels of verbal
communication skill, etc. One psychological dimension that affects the process of negotiation is NCC (Kruglanski andWebster,
1996; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994, 1997).
NCC can be considered an individual difference or as a situational variable (Webster and Kruglanski,1994). As an individual
difference, it is the level of a person’s intolerance for ambiguity or lack of clarity. As a situational variable, it is stronger in
conditions such as haste, stress, or limited access to information (De Dreu, 2003). This means that a person whose NCC is
generally low can, when tired or under stress, have a higher NCC and act accordingly. Regardless of its source (internal or
external), a high NCC favors fast decision making and use of heuristics, and negatively affects tolerance for difference or
ambiguity (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994, 1997).
NCC consists of two cognitive processes: 1) information gathering, or “seizing”, and 2) solidifying cognitive structures, or
“freezing” (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). In the “seizing” phase, an individual is open to new information and can gather
various data from the surroundings; the schema, or cognitive structure, is still very ﬂexible. In the “freezing” phase, an in-
dividual does not seek out new information but ﬁnalizes the cognitive structure that will, thereafter, no longer be so ﬂexible.
The duration of these phases varies. Individuals who have a high NCC tend to avoid the ambiguity that is characteristic of the
“seizing” phase and “freeze” as quickly as possible, for the cognitive clarity it affords. From the perspective of negotiations, of
course, this issue is not so simple. Apart from data gathering, the “seizing” phase also includes organization of information.
During communication, the structure of the relationships between various elements can be of critical importance to reaching
a common understanding of the situation and, in turn, to the outcome of negotiations. One of the most effective methods of
reaching a win–win solution is exchanging compromises on different dimensions, that is, working on the relationships be-
tween different dimensions.
The inﬂuence of NCC on the process of negotiation can be observed on a number of levels. First, people with a high NCC
tend toward more schematic information processing, are more likely to use heuristics, which shorten the time needed for
analysis and decision making, but can lead to an incomplete picture of the situation (De Dreu et al., 1999; Dijksterhuis et al.,
1996; Kruglanski and Freund, 1983). Second, although people with a high NCC function very well with clear, simple, or
familiar problems, they might have difﬁculties with constructing mental models that include many dynamic interdependent
variables. This means that theymight prematurely want to end discussions (Bukowski et al., 2012). Third, a high NCC can lead
people to make conclusions on the basis of incomplete information. Quick inferences can lead to incorrect conclusions
(Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). Fourth, people with a high NCC have a tendency to seek and quickly attach signiﬁcance to
information that is consistent with their existing beliefs (De Dreu et al., 1999).
Schematic information processing, quick inferences, a disinclination to construct complex, dynamic models, and quick
attachment to them all beneﬁt short discussions. In negotiations, NCC therefore can be seen as potentially leading to quick
(perhaps premature) conclusions or decisionmaking. Of course, there can bemany and various reasons behind quickly ending
discussions or coming to a fast decision. Moreover, NCC has been associatedwith an ability to disregard irrelevant information
(Kossowska, 2007), which might lead to correct solutions. Whatever the cause, the process of communication should be
shorter when NCC is high than it would be otherwise. When NCC is low, the communication process should be longer. While a
low NCC does not guarantee better solutions, it does appear that the duration of a negotiation is a signiﬁcant factor that
increases the chances of getting to an optimal solution (De Dreu et al., 1999).
In this article, we demonstrate how common ground is constructed, and we reveal the dynamics of its creation in two
cases, with high and low NCC. Theoretically, individuals with a high NCC should resist changing their existing mental
structures, defending their own representations of reality (De Dreu, 2003). Conversely, people with a low NCC should more
easily accept ideas and proposals from their interlocutor. These differences should have an impact on the dynamics of the
negotiation talks, the structure of the ﬁnal common ground, and the negotiators’ satisfaction with the interaction, both in
terms of the outcome and in terms of their subjective evaluation of the process of communication.
We focus here on theway inwhich NCCmight manifest in the complexity of the structure of the common ground between
negotiators. We propose that low NCC should allow negotiators to create large and/or complex structures with many con-
nections and interdependencies between elements. A high NCC, on the other hand, should lead to networks (structures) with
few elements and/or few connections between them.
The role of NCC in negotiations can be determined through appropriate research. To date, this has not been done, perhaps
due to a lack of adequate formal methodology. This obstacle is overcome with the Dynamical Negotiation Network model
proposed by Jochemczyk and Nowak (2010). This model represents the way a shared reality, or common ground, is arrived at
during a negotiation, through a dynamically constructed semantic network.
Ł. Jochemczyk et al. / Language Sciences 53 (2016) 44–57 471.4. The Dynamical Negotiation Network model
The Dynamical Negotiation Network model (DNN; Jochemczyk and Nowak, 2009, 2010) explains, or conveys, the
process of communication in negotiations as a semantic network. According to the assumptions of this model, the ne-
gotiators (interlocutors) build a shared reality, or common ground, during their interaction (Ahn and Yap, 2013; Clark and
Brennan, 1991; Hardin and Higgins, 1996). This common ground is represented in the DNN as a semantic network that
changes (nodes and connections are added, change value, etc.) as the interaction proceeds. Thus, the DNN is a special case
of class of complex adaptive networks (Gross and Sayama, 2009; Sayama et al., 2013). At any given moment of the
interaction, the network reﬂects the state of the shared reality for that moment. Adding new elements, or changing
existing elements, inﬂuences other elements of the network; that is, changes in one part of the network can provoke
changes in other parts. Thus, the DNN dynamically changes over time, precisely reﬂecting the changing understanding
negotiators have of their common ground. The DNN model was proposed originally to aid in analyzing the communi-
cation process in negotiations, but can be used to represent any verbal communication process (Jochemczyk and Nowak,
2010).
The DNN model assumes that building common ground is an interactive process that is reﬂected in the dynamics of
network construction (Jochemczyk and Nowak, 2009). Anything that is uttered is part of a common network, without
distinction betweenwhat is shared andwhat is individual. The network is therefore a de facto transcription of the interaction,
ultimately structured in a way that illuminates which elements were contentious and required elaboration and which were
not under debate.
The DNN model and the way it translates the negotiation process into a network has been described in detail elsewhere
(Jochemczyk and Nowak, 2010). In the second part of this article, we illustrate the ways negotiators who are high in NCC or
low in NCC construct a DNN. Here, we outline the basic steps of the procedure. The process of translating a negotiation into a
network is a qualitative procedure performed by trained coders. As a coder follows the interaction, he or she must identify
two basic types of elements: facts/objects, and the relationships between them. In the terminology of the DNN model, these
two types of elements are nodes and connections. Nodes represent statements, facts, or other issues under discussion, while
connections represent the relationships between these statements, facts, or issues. For example, a node in a negotiationmight
be the price of a given product, another might be its quality. An utterance referring to the relationship between thesedfor
example, that high quality can only be achieved with a high price tagdwould be a connection. We describe these elements
below, but readers interested in greater detail will ﬁnd them in Jochemczyk and Nowak (2010).
1.4.1. Nodes
If the sides in a negotiation want to discuss a fact or issue, they must ﬁrst introduce the issue to the network, creating a
node. Then they can go on to deﬁne, change, or conﬁrm the value of the node through subsequent utterances or connections
with other nodes. Each node is characterized by a certain value analogous to an activation level in neural networks (Kunda
and Thagard, 1996; Rumelhart, 1986). This value codes the truthfulness of each statement, or the intensity of a given issue
(e.g., the amount of money in a “money” node, or the intensity of color in a “green” node). Nodes can have values between
0 and 1 or between1 and 1. The ﬁrst range is used for coding truthfulness of nodes, or the value of unipolar nodes (0 is lack of
a given characteristic, 1 is full saturation). The 1 to 1 range is used for coding nodes whose properties can have semantically
opposite meanings (e.g., good vs. evil, green vs. red) or nodes that are bipolar (e.g., “price” coded positively means that person
A will pay, while a negative code would mean that person B will pay).
1.4.2. Connections
If the sides are discussing the relationships between facts or issues, they can be asserting that the issues are related
positively or negatively, or that the issues are unrelated. If the issues are related positively, the occurrence of one will be
accompanied by the occurrence of the other (e.g., high quality is accompanied by high price). A negative relationship indicates
that the occurrence of one will be accompanied by the absence of the other (e.g. high quality is accompanied by a lack of
malfunction). Unrelated issues are those where the occurrence of one tells us nothing about the occurrence or absence of the
other (e.g. high quality and color might not be related in any way). Relationships can vary in strength and in direction. The
strength of connection can theoretically take on values betweenminus inﬁnity and positive inﬁnity. Direction can be one-way
or two-way. One-way connections mean that we can predict from issue A the occurrence of issue B, but issue B will not tell us
anything about the occurrence of issue A. Two-way connections mean that the occurrence of each is informative with regard
to the other.
1.4.3. The functioning of the network
Theoretically, many connections are possible between nodes, depending on the issue that is negotiated. All connections
that are introduced into the network send signals between the nodes they connect and in this way affect their values. When a
single node is connected tomany other nodes, its value will be the total of all signals it receives from all of those others nodes.
The inﬂuence of one node on another is the product of the value of the originator node and the strength of the connection. For
example, if a node receives signals from two other nodes whose values are þ1 and 1, whose connection strengths are
identical, the value of the recipient node will be zero.
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Negotiators conduct their talks intuitively, in whatever way makes sense to them. Particularly when negotiators are not
experienced, the networks they construct are the result of their natural interaction styles. The structure of the network will
reﬂect the agreements and disagreements that negotiators encounter.
If one side introduces an issue (a node), and the other side does not agree with its value, this disagreement can be
expressed in one of two ways: 1) by introducing a new node that will negate the value of the contentious node; or 2) by
introducing a newconnection to an existing node that will negate the value of the contentious node. Both cases have the same
effect: the value of the contentious node is changed. If the sides still do not agree on the value, the process can continue with
the ﬁrst side introducing another node or connection, and so on, until some balance is reached. In this way, issues on which
there is disagreement become elements of common ground, and the disagreement about them is embedded in the network.
Changing the value of a node by introducing a new element into the network has the effect of increasing the connections
that go into the disputed node. Thus, the more incoming connections a node has in the ultimate network structure, the more
disagreement there was regarding the issue it represents. A lack of incoming connections indicates that the negotiators did
not feel the need to discuss the value of the node; that is, they either agreed on its value, or the issue was not important
enough to dispute.
The ﬁnal structure of the network is a function of several processes that take place during an interaction. First, there are
issues that the two sides want to reach an agreement on in order to achieve their negotiation goal. Second, there are nodes
and connections that are introduced in order to justify (changes to) the values of existing nodes. Finally, there are nodes and
connections that the sides do not spend time on because they are not prioritized or because the discussion ends before they
can be elaborated. Thus, the ultimate common ground consists of issues that were understood similarly from the outset, and
thosewhosemeaning or value had to be arrived at through interaction. Thanks to this structure, we can seewhich issues are a
source of conﬂict and who convinced whom of what.
1.4.5. Coding the negotiation network
The structure of the network (common ground) created by interlocutors can be analyzed at a number of levels of gen-
erality/speciﬁcity. The same utterance can be coded on a very speciﬁc level, using a number of nodes, or on an general level,
using one, more abstract node. For example, a farmer discussing what crop he would like to plant might consider the issue of
the proﬁtability of a particular crop. This can be represented as a single node, such as “proﬁtability”. This same issue can be
represented as number of more speciﬁc nodes that are connected to each other. For example, “labor intensity”, “ease of
storage”, “frost resistance”, “water needs”, “fertilization needs”, and so on. Each issue can, theoretically, be divided into an
inﬁnite number of lower-level nodes. The connections between these lower-level nodes, as well as to the other nodes in the
network, can become quite complicated. Thus, themore abstract our network representation, the simpler it is to interpret, but
the less useful the interpretation. At the highest level of abstraction, any conﬂict can be represented as two oppositional
nodes, but such a representation will not let us draw conclusions about why the sides are in conﬂict or how they see the
relationships between aspects of their conﬂict. On the other hand, the more speciﬁc a representation, the easier it will be to
recognize the real interdependencies between issues, but the more complex the network will be.
Thus, the coding procedure in such research necessarily balances the goals of a true representation versus an easily
interpretable representation. A decision about the level of coding must be made before a negotiation is translated into a
network. In our research, we code at a low level of abstraction. Our coders are instructed to include as many nodes as they
consider necessary, when in doubt adding new nodes rather than assuming that a new issue ﬁts into an existing node.
Although time-consuming, this narrows the range of individual coders’ interpretations of what is more or less important in a
negotiation, which increases the reliability of the coding process.
2. Empirical illustration
Here, we present an empirical illustration of these negotiation networks based on two negotiations. One was conducted
between two high NCC individuals, the other between two low NCC individuals. These two negotiations were part of a larger
study inwhich 38 pairs of individuals (38 men and 38 women) aged 19–32 years (M¼ 22.0; SD¼ 2.2) participated. They were
recruited through social media sites on the internet for a study on negotiations. All of the participants lived in Warsaw and
were current students or recent graduates.
Participants were pre-selected for this larger study based on scores on the abridged NCC scale (Kossowska et al., 2012;
Cronbach’s a ¼ .698 in our sample), which they ﬁlled out online. This scale comprises two factors: motivation to make quick
decisions, and motivation to create and maintain simple structures in one’s mind (Kossowska et al., 2002; Neuberg et al.,
1997). These are factors that we considered would affect the dynamics and structures of negotiations: the former, because
it would lead to consideration of fewer alternatives, and the latter because it would lead to resistance to incorporating the
other side’s different judgments about negotiated issues. Based on their responses to the abridged NCC scale, participants
were assigned to a low NCC group (scores in the lowest 25% of the distribution,M ¼ 45.0, SD ¼ 3.4, where scores could range
from 15 to 90) or a high NCC group (scores in the highest 25% of the distribution, M ¼ 62.1, SD ¼ 3.0).
Static analyses of the relationship between NCC and outcomes of these negotiations have been previously published
(Pietrzak et al., 2014). In this article, we show qualitative network analyses of the dynamics of constructing common ground
by a pair with a high NCC, and a pair with a low NCC.
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The selected participants were invited to come to the lab for an hour-long in-person negotiation study for which they
would be paid 15–20 PLN depending on their negotiation outcome (in fact, all participants were paid the maximum amount,
20 PLN, approx. 6 USD). Participants were paired with a same-gender partner of the same NCC level (high or low). In the lab,
they ﬁrst read the negotiation scenario. Second, they ﬁlled out a questionnaire about their perception of the other negotiator,
their attitude towards the process, their expectations, and preferred results. Then, the two sides negotiated. Participants were
informed that on average a negotiation takes about 15 min, but they were not given a time limit. In all cases, the negotiations
endedwhen negotiators came to an agreement. The negotiationwas video-recorded. After the negotiations, participants were
separated and watched the recording of their negotiation. While watching, they rated their moment-to-moment NCC (to
what extent they wanted to continue vs. end the negotiations at that moment) using a mouse-paradigm procedure (Vallacher
et al., 1994). After this procedure, participants ﬁlled out a second questionnaire, in which they assessed their procedural and
distributive satisfaction, their perception of the other negotiator, their perception of the process etc. Finally, participants were
thanked and received payment for participation.
2.2. Negotiation scenario
The negotiations concerned opening a business growing organic vegetables. The negotiators were neighbors with
adjacent gardens. They had a number of issues to discuss with regard to initial contributions to the business: ﬁnancial
input, how much of each garden was to be used, how much labor each could devote to the business over the coming
months, and what to plant. The ﬁrst three dimensions (money, garden plot, and labor) were translated for each negotiator
separately into points that would be used to determine their ultimate payment for participation (though in fact, all
participants received the maximum possible payment). The last dimension, what to plant (tomatoes or carrots) was not
worth any points, but was a point of contention because the negotiation scenarios contained conﬂicting information
about proﬁtability. An integrated solution was possible, as was a 50–50 split. The negotiation scenario is included in the
Appendix.
2.3. Analyses
We analyze two negotiation networks that were created based on transcripts of two dyadic negotiations. The transcripts
were translated into network structures by two trained coders, who independently coded each and then reconciled dis-
crepancies through discussion. We will show illustrative examples of a high-NCC negotiation and a low-NCC negotiation,
chosen for their prototypicality (representativeness) for the studied groups. In the Results section, we show how these
networks were constructed and note their structural and temporal characteristics. Herewe outlinemeasures used to describe
and compare negotiation networks. More on these measures can be found in Wasserman and Faust (1994).
2.3.1. Network indicators
A number of indicators can be used to describe the structure of a network. Thesemeasures can tell us something about the
speciﬁc elements of the network, or about the network as a whole. The basic indicators of the signiﬁcance of particular issues
focus on: a) how central a node is in the network and b) the extent to which that node controls signals passed through the
network by other nodes.
The ﬁrst of these indicators, centrality, can be understood as the sum of connections a node has, or its Degree.Degree can be
broken down into InDegree (a measure of incoming connections) and OutDegree (a measure of outgoing connections). The
average Degree that nodes in a network have tells us about Network Density, which is calculated by the number of nodes
divided by the number of connections in the network. An alternative measure of a node’s centrality is Closenessda node’s
distance to other nodes (howmany other nodes a signal coming from it would have to go through to get to any particular node
in the network). The higher a node’s Closeness, the lower the distance that separates it from other nodes, globally. A node
with the greatest possible value of Closeness will be a ‘star’ type that is directly connected to all other nodes in the network.
The extent towhich a node controls signals is Betweenness, which is ameasure that indicates the extent towhich that node
lies along the shortest possible paths between other pairs of nodes. Themore of these shortest paths a given nodes lies on, the
greater its Betweenness.
A network can be analyzed as a structure of connected nodes either taking into account directionality of connections
(termed a directed network) or disregarding directionality (an undirected network). Some network indicators can differ
depending on whether the network is analyzed as a directed or undirected one. For example, the distance between node A
and node B is measured by the number of connections needed to get from one to the other. Two nodes can be closely
connected (with one single node C between them) in an undirected network, while their distance can be inﬁnite (undeﬁned)
in a directed network (if node C has only incoming connections). Closeness and Betweenness indicators can therefore be quite
variable in directed networks.
The indicators described above can be calculated for each node in the network. Using the outcomes of these calculations, it
becomes possible to calculate the distribution of each indicator for the network as a whole. This is called Centralization. The
more equal the distribution of a given indicator is, the lower the network’s Centralization. Thus, if we know the Degree,
Ł. Jochemczyk et al. / Language Sciences 53 (2016) 44–5750Closeness, and Betweenness of each node in our network, we can calculate Degree Centralization, Closeness Centralization, and
Betweenness Centralization to describe the network as a whole.
Other indicators of network structure exist (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), but the ones given here are sufﬁcient to describe
the networks we studied.
3. Results
We present the results below for two networks, one analysis representing a high NCC pair, and the other representing a
low NCC pair. Network analyses were performed with R and the SNA package (Butts, 2008; Ripley et al., 2014).
3.1. Rate of network construction
We look ﬁrst at the dynamics of network construction over the course of the negotiations as awhole. Each negotiationwas
divided into ﬁve stages to simplify analyses of structural change in the network. Divisions were made so that the stages
contained a more or less equal number of words (in the written transcription of the negotiation). No negotiator’s utterances
were divided, however, so this criterion was not strict. Previous studies have demonstrated that this is a good way to divide
negotiations into stages (Jochemczyk and Nowak, 2009).
Fig. 1 shows the number of nodes introduced into common ground in each negotiation stage. Fig. 2 shows similar data for
linksmade between nodes. In both cases, sides start introducing nodes and connections from the beginning of the negotiation
and this process gradually slows down toward the end of the negotiation.
3.2. Negotiation network structure over time
Fig. 3 shows the ﬁnal network structure produced by the negotiators with a high NCC, while Fig. 4 shows the ﬁnal structure
for the pair with a low NCC. The nodes that were introduced in each stage of the negotiation are presented in separate boxes.
No new nodes were introduced in the ﬁfth stage of negotiations.
When graphically represented, positive connections are drawnwith a solid line, and negative connections are drawnwith
a dotted line. Strength of connection is designated by thickness: the stronger the connection, the stronger the inﬂuence and
the thicker the line. Similarly, a nodewith a positive valence is surrounded by a solid line, while a negative node is surrounded
by a dotted line. Again, the value is coded by the thickness of the linedthe thicker the line, the greater the node’s value
(whether positive or negative).
After the ﬁrst stage of the negotiation, the structures of the networks look similar. There are a fewmore nodes and links in
the structure for the low NCC pair, but the structures themselves do not differ substantially.
After stage 2, the low NCC pair has three separate segments, or components, of a network. The smallest component has
only two elements, and will be developed in stage 3. The high NCC pair, meanwhile, has only one major component, and one
single node unconnected to it.
In the third stage, the differences between the networks are maintained. The lowNCC pair’s negotiation network has three
separate components of similar sizes, while the high NCC pair’s one component continues to grow (and the lone node remains
unconnected to any others).
In the fourth stage of negotiation, the low NCC pair’s network has three components, of which two are 10 nodes in size,
unchanged from stage 2, and the third has grown from 9 to 17 nodes. The links in this last component have risen from 17 to 27
(the network as a whole now has 57 links) while the other two components have not changed. In this situation, the nego-
tiators are focusing only on the fragments of the network that are currently under discussiondthe other parts go unmen-
tioned. In the high NCC negotiation, the number of nodes increased by 8 (to 41), and the number of links rose by 8 (to 60). The
network remains one large component, plus two solitary nodes that have no links to any others.Fig. 1. Total number of nodes in the network in consecutive stages of the negotiation.
Fig. 2. Total number of links in the network in consecutive stages of the negotiation.
Fig. 3. Final structure of the negotiation network constructed by high NCC negotiators.
Ł. Jochemczyk et al. / Language Sciences 53 (2016) 44–57 51In the ﬁnal, ﬁfth stage, low NCC negotiators did not change the structure of the network at all; no new nodes or links were
added. The negotiation concerned only the values of the existing nodes. The high NCC negotiators added four new links
between existing nodes in this last stage.3.3. The ﬁnal negotiation network structure
In its ﬁnal form, the low NCC network contains three separate components of similar size, while the high NCC network is
one large component. This latter network is one in which elements are connected in a complicated way, and there are paths
(regardless of directionality) connecting pairs of all nodes.Within the former network, nodes in each of the three components
Fig. 4. Final structure of the negotiation network constructed by low NCC negotiators.
Ł. Jochemczyk et al. / Language Sciences 53 (2016) 44–5752are connected in a much simpler waydthis is exempliﬁed by the fact that one can draw the network in such a way that links
between nodes do not intersect (see Fig. 4), and the nodes are situated quite close to each other. The samemethod of situating
nodes in the high NCC network gives a much more complicated representation (see Fig. 3). In the following paragraphs, we
show how these differences are reﬂected in the network measures and indicators outlined above.
We calculated the indicators described in the Analyses section (2.3) to describe the two networks. We assumed directed
networks in the results presented here. However, analyses conducted with undirected networks gave similar results.
The densities of the networks were similar. Representing density as the average Degree, i.e., density per node, shows that
the high NCC network had a density of k¼ 3.02, while the low NCC network had a density of k¼ 3. This means that the nodes
in both networks had an average of about 3 links each.
The two negotiations were not as similar on measures that reﬂect the complexity of connections in the networks:
Betweenness and Closeness. Most networks we encounter in everyday life (Albert and Barabási, 2002), including semantic
networks (Steyvers and Tenenbaum, 2005), have power-law distributions. This is also true of negotiation networks
(Jochemczyk, 2008). For this reason, it is worth considering not only mean values but also measures such as minimums,
maximums, medians, and sums of all values.
We calculated the Betweenness (the extent towhich a given node ‘controls’ the signal ﬂow between other nodes) of all the
nodes. For the network constructed by high NCC negotiators, themaximum Betweenness scorewas 169.00, while for lowNCC
negotiators it was 45.00. The means for Betweenness were 21.00 for high the NCC network and 6.83 for the lowNCC network.
The median Betweenness was the same for both: 1.50. A boxplot showing these results is presented in Fig. 5. These co-
efﬁcients have very skewed distributions, with large differences between the maximum values of Betweenness in the two
networks. In Table 1, we show results for Betweenness centralization, according to which the distribution of Betweenness for
the high NCC network is more variable than for the low NCC network.
We calculated Closeness coefﬁcients for all nodes (an indicator of the distance from a given node to all others). For the high
NCC network, the maximum Closeness vale was .297, while for the low NCC network it was .162. The means for these co-
efﬁcients for high NCC and lowNCC respectively were .102 and .078, while themedians were .115 and .090. These boxplots are
presented in Fig. 6. In Table 1, we show Closeness Centralization results that demonstrate that the Closeness distribution for
the high NCC negotiation network is more variable than the Closeness distribution for low NCC negotiation network.
3.3.1. Network centralization
Measures of centralization reﬂect the distribution of the indicators in a network. The greater the Centralization coefﬁcient,
the greater the differences among the nodes and connections of the network; that is, the less uniform it is with regard to that
Table 1
Network centralization measures for the negotiations with low and high NCC.
Degree In Degree Out Degree Betweenness Closeness
High NCC .10 .09 .14 .10 .0050
Low NCC .06 .07 .07 .03 .0025
Fig. 5. Directed Betweenness for the networks created by negotiators with low and high NCC.
Fig. 6. Directed Closeness for the networks created by negotiators with low and high NCC.
Ł. Jochemczyk et al. / Language Sciences 53 (2016) 44–57 53indicator. In Table 1, we show the following indicators for the high and the low NCC negotiation networks: Degree, In Degree,
Out Degree, directed Betweenness, and directed Closeness. For all of these, the network constructed by the high NCC pair of
negotiators has higher values than the network constructed by the low NCC negotiators.4. Discussion
In this article, we illustrated the process of building common ground between interlocutors. We analyzed negotiations
conducted by two pairs of individualsda pair with low NCC, and a pair with high NCCdto explore how they constructed a
network of shared meanings. To perform these analyses, we used the DNN model (Jochemczyk and Nowak, 2010), which
allowed us to translate a dyadic interaction into a developing semantic network. The results showed that while the number of
nodes and connections in the networks (the size of the common ground) might be similar, the networks structures might
differ in their complexity.
Although the NCC construct is one that has been studied in the social sciences for some time (Jasko et al., 2015; Kruglanski
and Webster, 1996), little is known about how it affects interactions. The construct is theoretically related to cognitive
processes, yet most studies on NCC in fact investigate the outcome of those processes, not the dynamics leading up to those
outcomes. This means that the kinds of conclusions that are drawnmust be limited. Using methodology that allows us to look
at network dynamics, we can make inferences about the information processing that leads to particular outcomes. This paper
illustrates this procedure.
We looked at four main properties of networks constructed during a dyadic negotiation: 1) the rate of network con-
struction; 2) the dynamics of network construction, including numbers of links, nodes, and components; 3) the ﬁnal structure
of the constructed networks; and 4) the degree of centralization of the networks.
Ł. Jochemczyk et al. / Language Sciences 53 (2016) 44–5754The analyses indicated that the rate of construction and overall size of analyzed networks were similar for the two pairs.
The two negotiating pairs introduced nodes and links into the network similarly. There were, however, differences in the way
that elements were added: very early on, the low NCC pair had created a network comprising three separate components,
while the high NCC pair ended up with a single-component network. These networks differed in their ﬁnal form as well: the
network of the low NCC pair had more components of which all had relatively simple, uniform structures of links, and
therefore low coefﬁcients of closeness, than the network of the high NCC pair. They, meanwhile, had a network with higher
centralization indicators than did the low NCC pair, which means that their network had a more varied distribution of
Centrality coefﬁcients (Degree, Betweenness, and Closeness, both for directed and undirected analyses). This pattern, albeit
shown just by one pair in each category, was contrary to our prediction that high NCC negotiators would create less complex
structures than would low NCC negotiators.
The mechanisms leading to more complex structures of common ground that might result from cognitive closure are not
clear. We can speculate on these mechanisms. For example, if I am convinced that tomatoes will be more proﬁtable than
carrots in the upcoming season, and my business partner believes that carrots will be more proﬁtable, then I must present an
argument that defends my position. In the terminology of the DNN model, making this argument is equivalent to adding a
new node that is linked to tomatoes and increases its value. The other negotiator, in response, can add his or her own
counterargument, or underminemy argument, by adding another node. I can then strengthenmy argument or undermine the
other side’s. Unless one side decides on a concession, such a discussion could theoretically go on indeﬁnitely, creating a
network of interdependencies all linked to the tomatoes node. This would be less likely if both sides were more ﬂexible. A
weaker need tomaintain one’s own point of viewmightmeanweakermotivation to argue for speciﬁc conceptualizations, and
so a weaker intent to introduce new arguments defending that point of view. This might ultimately be reﬂected in a simpler
network structure. These are processes that remain to be clariﬁed in future research.
It is worth noting that NCC consists of two tendencies: seizing and freezing (Kruglanski andWebster, 1996), which refer to
different processes. This is an important distinction because, as was shown by De Dreu (2003), creating urgency in a
negotiation (prompting seizing) provokes heuristic thinking and limits the chances of attaining an integrated solution. In this
study, we focused on NCC from the perspective of the need to maintain one’s own structural representation of a given
problem, which can be considered more in terms of the tendency to freeze. If we translate the concept of NCC into the DNN
model, processes involved in freezing relate to a defense of the structure of one’s own understanding. Seizing would refer to
an increase in the rate of building a common network, or a premature halt to its construction. It might be that people of
various levels of NCC (as an individual difference), subjected to the same time pressure, will construct different networks,
though all of them might be incomplete. This is an empirical question to which the answer must be found in future studies.
In terms of how this tendency to permanence might affect communication, research we conducted on the same group of
negotiators with high vs. low NCC (Pietrzak et al., 2014) showed that people with a low NCC declared a greater sense of
seeking win–win (integrated) solutions during the negotiations than did people with a high NCC. This result can be inter-
preted in reference to the processes of building common ground found in the pairs described here. We propose that nego-
tiators with a lowNCCwere less likely to oppose developments to the network structure proposed by their interlocutors than
were negotiators with a high NCC. Since the number of connections in the two networks was not signiﬁcantly different, we
can infer that the low NCC networks had a less complex structure, in that there were fewer mutual oppositions between
nodes. This ease in construction of the network apparently translated to a sense of cooperativeness in the negotiation, despite
the groups not ultimately differing in their achievement of integrated solutions.
A lowNCCmight generate fewer problems agreeing on the individual values of nodes, and connections between them, and
this relative lack of local conﬂicts can result in less need for debate and, in consequence, smaller networks. For people of high
NCC, meanwhile, it might be unpleasant to build large networks due to the need for resolving local conﬂicts, but this might be
necessary in order to maintain their original representation of the negotiated issue. This will result in a greater number of
nodes and connections in the common ground. A study that would illuminate these processes could be one inwhich people of
various levels of NCC have conﬂicting information about issues that are more or less important to their outcomes. This would
allow us to determine the conditions in which larger or smaller common ground networks are constructed. It is possible that
low NCC negotiators would be more easily distracted by irrelevant connections when interacting with skilled negotiators,
while those with a high NCC would be more able to navigate around such distractions to come to the solution they seek.
Another questionworth investigating in future research concerns the relationship between the structure of networks, and
the dynamics of constructing them, vis-a-vis better or worse (more or less integrative) objective outcomes and subjective
experiences (e.g., trust in the negotiation partner, satisfaction with the outcome). Moreover, it is possible to investigate how
the change in mental representation of an issue changes through the negotiation process (and NCC could be taken account in
predicting such changes). Everyone who enters a negotiation does so with certain expectations with regard to the important
issues and the connections between them. It is likely that the negotiation process changes this pattern of interdependencies,
perhaps more so for individuals low in NCC. This remains to be tested.
We believe that the analytical procedure outlined here provides interesting and important new indicators to describe the
process of communication. Nonetheless, this paper is foremost an illustration of method, rather than an investigation of a
psychological phenomenon. For the purposes of this paper, we selected two pairs from our sample, one of low and one of high
NCC participants, to serve as a demonstration of the DNNmethod. These pairs might not be representative for all the high and
low NCC cases and so generalizability should not be assumed. Analyses should be conducted on other negotiation networks,
even from within our sample, in order to demonstrate reliability. Including other samples, perhaps made up of individuals
Ł. Jochemczyk et al. / Language Sciences 53 (2016) 44–57 55with greater negotiation experience, would also increase the faith we have in our conclusions. Additionally, the negotiation
scenario was quite artiﬁcialdit will be important to study the construction of a negotiation network among people who are
experienced and for whom the issue has real-world signiﬁcance.
A fundamental issue with network analyses is that the construction of the network itself (determining what constitutes a
separate node, how connections should be drawn, etc.) is subjective. The coder must be trained but must also use his or her
intuitions with regard to identifying a node as positive and the connection as negative, or vice versa. In this study, each
network was independently constructed by two trained coders, who resolved inconsistencies through discussion. This brings
us closer to objectivity, but is not enough to fully satisfy standards that would guarantee the reliability of our conclusions. This
issue is of course not limited to our study, but concerns network analyses and qualitative approaches more broadly.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an analysis of the construction of a shared, common ground in two dyads of negotiators. The
communication process of the negotiators affected how they built the semantic network that they then used to make de-
cisions and come to an agreement. In two analyzed cases, we revealed that although the sizes of the networks of common
ground of the low NCC and high NCC negotiators were similar, the interconnectedness of these networks was different. Thus,
the complexity of such networksmay vary independent of size. In this way, we demonstrate that the DNNmodel is a good tool
to represent and analyze the dynamics of the creation of common ground as well as its ﬁnal structure.Acknowledgments
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Appendix. Negotiation scenario
Negotiation script. Bold text indicates information provided to the south neighbor; text in italics indicates information
provided to the north neighbor. Scripts were written to match the gender of participants.
South neighbor/North neighbor
You have been thinking about opening up your own business, growing and selling organic vegetables, for some time. You
would need a large plot of land for this, so you have started talking to your neighbor to discuss going into business together. If
you join your (adjacent) yards, youwill have enough land to start a viable business. To open the business, youwill also have to
split the costs of purchasing seedlings and necessary equipment and installations (fence, irrigation, etc.). Furthermore, you
will have to divide the labor involved in this enterprise (how many weeks are needed to get the garden going). Finally, you
will have to decide what to plant (which might be most important). You have decided to split the proﬁts 50–50, regardless of
investments.
The speciﬁc conditions of your agreement can be translated into points. Themore points you have at the end of the season,
the better. These points will let you determine your preferences for various solutions.
Your yard is 1000m2, divided into 10 equal segments. You can devote up to 9 segments/9 segments to the business. To open
the business, you will need 10 segments in total. For each segment LESS than 9 that you devote to the business, you will
receive 1 point/2 points. If your neighbor provides the whole land necessary, you will receive 9 points/18 points. If you each
provide 5 segments, you will get 4 points/8 points. If you devote your 9 segments to the business, you will not get any points.
You have estimated the cost of seedlings and other equipment to be 10 thousand PLN. The maximum you can invest is 8
thousand zł/6 thousand PLN. For each 1 thousand PLN you invest LESS than that, you will receive 1 point/2 points. Thus, if you
invest nothing and your neighbor pays the full 10 thousand you will get 8 points/12 points. If you split the costs 50–50, you
will get 3 points/2 points. If you spend all of your money, you will not get any points.
You have estimated the amount of labor necessary to get the business going to be 10 weeks. You have various plans for
the spring-summer season, so you can spend up to 6 weeks on the business, but you would prefer not to spend any time
on it at all. You have no particular plans for the spring-summer season, so you can spend a full 10 weeks on the business. For each
week FEWER than 6 weeks/10 weeks you will receive 8 points/1 point. Thus, if your neighbor does all the work, you will
receive 48 points/10 points. If you split the labor 50–50, you will receive 8 points/5 points. If you devote all the time you have
to the business, you will not get any points.
Your vegetable garden will be divided into 10 standard segments, on which you can plant various vegetables. You have
decided to plant either carrots or tomatoes. These two crops currently are likely to provide the same proﬁt. However, in the
Weekly Gardener/Farmer’s Weekly, you have read that the price of tomatoes/carrots should be about 10% higher than it is
now. The price of carrots/tomatoes, meanwhile, is unlikely to change. You remember that the Weekly Gardener/Farmer’s
Weekly has always been a good predictor of vegetable prices. Your proﬁt ultimately depends on the future prices of the
vegetables you decide to plant. If tomato/carrot prices rise by 10%, your proﬁt will be 10% greater. If, on the other hand, the
prices fall by 10%, your proﬁts will be lower. You can plant tomatoes and carrots/carrots and tomatoes in whatever pro-
portions you want in your garden, but your proﬁt will depend on their future prices.
Ł. Jochemczyk et al. / Language Sciences 53 (2016) 44–5756Your task is to negotiate the best possible terms of entering into this business with your neighbor. Take a moment to think
about the points in this game, and think about reasons that might underlie your preference for some solutions over others.
Remember that the total proﬁt will be split in half between you and your partner, regardless of investments. Your ﬁnal results
will be the proﬁt you make, plus the points you earn. The more points you earn, the better.
Summarizing, you need:
 Land/ 10 segments. You can devote up to 9 – each segment less/ D1 point/þ2 points.
 Money/ 10 thousand PLN. You can invest up to 8000/6000 PLN – each 1 thousand less/ D1 point/þ2 points.
 Labor/ 10 weeks. You can devote 6 weeks/10 weeks – each week less/ D8 points/þ1 point.
 Seedlings/ what proportion of carrots vs. tomatoes you plant will ultimately determine your proﬁt. According to the
Weekly Gardener/Farmer’s Weekly, the price of tomatoes/carrots will be higher this year.References
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